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Abstract
A cognitive architecture for inner speech is presented. It is based on the Standard
Model of Mind, integrated with modules for self-talking processes. Briefly, the work-
ing memory of the proposed architecture includes the phonological loop as a compo-
nent which manages the exchanging information between the phonological store and
the articulatory control system. The inner dialogue is modeled as a loop where the
phonological store hears the inner voice produced by the hidden articulator process.
A central executive module drives the whole system, and contributes to the generation
of conscious thoughts by retrieving information from long-term memory. The surface
form of thoughts thus emerges by the phonological loop. Once a conscious thought
is elicited by inner speech, the perception of new context takes place and then repeat-
ing the cognitive loop. A preliminary formalization by event calculus of some of the
described processes, and early results of their implementation on the humanoid robot
Pepper by SoftBank Robotics are discussed.
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1. Introduction
Daily, human beings are engaged in a form of inner dialogue, which enables them to
high-level cognition, including self-control, self-attention and self-regulation. By inner
dialogue, a person plans tasks, finds problem’s solution, self-reflects, critical thinks,
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feels emotions, and restructures the perception of the world and of himself. Obviously,
the inner dialogue cannot be directly observed, thus making empirical studies difficult.
However, psychological and philosophical perspectives were developed during the last
decades, and are recognized in research communities.
Alderson-Day and Fernyhough [1] states that to talk to oneself makes a person able
to retrieve memorized facts, learn new knowledge and, in general, to simplify other-
wise demanding cognitive processes. According , the self-dialogue is closely related
to thought, and therefore is an essential component in the dynamics of information
thinking. In fact, Carruthers [2], Jackendoff [3], among many others, claim that gen-
uine conscious thoughts need language. Vygotsky [4] considers inner language as
the result of an internalization process during which linguistic explanations by a care-
giver to a children become an inner conversation of the children with the self when
he is engaged in similar task. Morin [5] states that inner dialogue can be linked to
self-consciousness. Self-concentration on internal resources triggers inner speech and
generates self-awareness on these resources.
Baddeley [9] described the inner speech phenomena by a working memory archi-
tecture, which is suitable for the automation of the process into artificial agent. In
particular, Baddeley claimed that the inner voice is the re-entrance of a sentences to
an inner ear covertly produced by an articulatory system. The inner ear and the artic-
ulatory system form the phonological loop. A central executive module oversees the
whole processes; the phonological cycle deals with spoken and written data, and the
visuospatial sketchpad deals with information in visual or spatial form. The linguistic
information are deal by the phonological loop, where the phonological cycle tests and
stores verbal information from the phonological store, which is a kind of a short term
memory.
The Baddeley’s model is the base of the cognitive architecture for inner speech
developed at the RoboticsLab of the University of Palermo [7], that integrates the Stan-
dard Model of Mind proposed by Laird et al. [8] with the working memory by Baddeley
and with the perception loop introduced in Chella and Macaluso [10].
The goal of this paper is to show such an architecture and an early formalization
by event calculus of the underlying processes. The paper is organized as follow: a
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brief overview of inner speech for artificial agents is presented at 2. The cognitive
architecture with first automation is described at 3. A case of study on inner speech in
robot is shown at 4. Finally, conclusions and future works are discussed at 5.
2. Inner speech for artificial agents
In literature, few works investigate the role of inner speech for artificial agents.
Steels [11] argues that language re-entrance allows refining the syntax of a grammar
emerging during oral interactions within a population of agents. The syntax becomes
more complex and complete by the parsing of previously produced utterances by the
same agent. In the same line, Clowes et al. [12] discusses the effect of words back-
propagation in a recurrent neural network. The output nodes are words interpreted as
possible actions to take. When such words are re-entrant by back-propagating them
to a specific input node, the selection of the plausible action for a task is more correct
than the case without back-propagation.
The cited works demonstrated the positive effects for the artificial agents of re-
parsing the produced linguistic utterances, but they do not investigate the underlying
motivations. Why words back-propagation produces better results is unknow.
A preliminary study about the proposed cognitive architecture for inner speech was
discussed at [7], where the modules of the Baddeley’s phonological loop are integrated
into the Standard Model of Mind by Laird et al.[8], and principles by Morin related
to the inner speech triggering and self-consciousness are modeled too. Some of the
authors suggested to integrate such an architecture into the IDyOT system [13].
By formalizing the processes of the architecture through event calculus, we at-
tempt to identify the functions at the basis of inner speech phenomena. Thus we can
implement them into the artificial agents, while observing and motivating the obtained
results.
3. The proposed architecture
Figure 1 shows the proposed cognitive architecture for inner speech. The structure
and processes of the Standard Model of Mind are further decomposed with the aims
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Figure 1: The proposed cognitive architecture for inner speech.
to integrate the components and the processes defined by the inner speech theories
previously presented.
3.1. Perception and Motor Modules
The perception module of the proposed architecture includes two sub-modules, that
are:
• the proprioception module which is related to the perception of the self, with
emotions (Emo), belief, desires, intentions (BDI), and the physical body (Body)
including all physical components of the agent;
• the exteroception module related to the perception of the entities into the envi-
ronment, not including the self.
According to Morin [5], the proprioception is triggered by the social milieu (what the
other tell about me), by self-reflection stimuli (mirrors, videocamera, etc...), and by the
social interactions, as face-to-face interaction that foster self-world differentiation.
The motor module includes three sub-components:
• the Action module, which acts on the outside world producing modifications to
the environment (not including the self) and the working memory;
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• Self Action module (SA), which represents the actions that the agent takes on
itself, i.e., self-regulation, self-focusing, and self-analysis;
• the Covert Articulator module (CA), which emulates the articulatory system by
Baddeley, but in this case it is related to the silent articulation of sentences, i.e.
it produces the inner voice, then rehearsed by the phonological store, thus mod-
eling the phonological loop.
3.1.1. Automating perception and motor modules
To automate the perception of a fact from the whole environment (including the
self), we define a set of modal operators from event calculus [14].
A fact is represented by a proposition φ. As consequence, we consider propo-
sitions that model facts related to the self (φself ) and propositions that model facts
of the domain, not including the self (φd). For example, the proposition φself =
holds(battery(low), t) means that the battery of the robot is low at t. The typical
holds function of the event calculus returns the boolean value specifying such a condi-
tion, thus φself is a fact regarding the self. The φd = holds(on(apple, table), t) states
that an apple is on a table, and regards a fact domain.
The modal operator P models the perception of a fact, that is P(φ) means that the
robot is perceiving the fact φ, that could be about the self (and in this case φ = φself )
or about the domain (and in this case φ = φd).
The modal operator A defines the execution of a particular action whose effect on
the environment is the proposition φ. As consequence, A(φ) means that the robot is
taking an action whose effect is the true condition of φ (which can be φ = φself or
φ = φd).
The standard intensional operators for belief B, desire D, intention I are included
too, and have the same semantics of the previous ones.
All the modal operators are true conditions, and they are in turn propositions.
3.2. The Memory Structure
The memory structure, inspired by the Standard Model of the Mind, is divided
into three types of memories: the short-term memory (STM), the procedural and the
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declarative long-term memory (LTM), and the working memory system (WMS).
The short-term memory holds sensory information from the environment that were
suitable coded by perception module. In the proposed architecture, it includes the
phonological store (PS), that emulates the inner ear for inner voice. Information flow
from perception to STM allows storing these coded signals. In particular, informa-
tion from perception to the PS is related to conscious thoughts when they come from
exteroception, and to self-conscious thoughts when they come from proprioception.
The reverse information flow from STM to perception provides expectations or pos-
sible hypotheses that are employed for influencing the attention process. In particular,
the flow from the PS to proprioception enables the self-focus modality.
The long-term memory stores learned behaviors, knowledge, and experience. In
our model, beyond these typical contents of the Standard Model of Mind, it includes:
• in the declarative LTM:
– the LanguageLTM memory which contains the linguistics data including
lexicon and grammatical structures;
– the Episodic Long-Term Memory (EPLTM), which is the declarative long-
term memory component which communicates to the Episodic Buffer (EB)
within the working memory system, and acts as a ‘backup’ store of long-
term memory data;
• in the procedural LTM, the composition rules according to which the linguistic
structures are arranged for producing sentences at different levels of complete-
ness and complexity.
Finally, the working memory system includes the Central Executive (CE) sub compo-
nent which manages and controls the linguistic information of the rehearsal loop by the
integrating (i.e., combining) data from the phonological store and also drawing on data
held in the long-term memory. The working memory system deals with cognitive tasks
such as mental arithmetic and problem-solving.
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Figure 2: An excerpt of the whole architecture with details about the rehearsing process.
3.2.1. Automating the cognitive cycle
Figure 2 shows a detail of the architecture; it highlights the cognitive cycle of inner
speech, and the corresponding functions we define for implementing the rehearsing
process.
A cognitive cycle starts with the perception and the conversion of external signals in
linguistics data, which are stored (as heard) into the phonological store. The perception
of the fact φ is formalized by the modal operator P(φ) inputted into the perception
module. The inference schemata:
P(φ)
φ
automates the signal codification into linguistics form. In particular, the  operator,
applied to a proposition, returns the linguistic representation of that proposition, which
is the set of words (that are not native of the event calculus) the proposition contains.
For example, for the proposition φself = holds(battery(low), t), the set of not native
words is φself = {battery, low}, begin holds and t typical event calculus expres-
sions. The inference schemata represented into the perception module formalizes the
association of this linguistic form to each perceived fact.
The information flow from perception module to the phonological store is formal-
ized by inputting φ to PS, and it represents the information storing. The reverse flow
is automated by the function focus(φ), and allows to retrieve correlated fact to φ by
perception.
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The central executive manages the inner thinking process by enabling the working
memory system to selectively attend to some stimuli or ignore others, according to the
rules stored within the LTMs, and by orchestrating the phonological loop as a slave
system.
Formally, four steps implement the rehearsing process:
1. the working memory system receives φ;
2. the central executive recalls data from long and short term memories (including
the episodic buffer) by the function recall(φ);
3. the phonological loop integratesφ with new retrieved information by the func-
tion integrate(recall(φ));
4. the phonological loop triggers inner speech by producing and parsing the new
extended form of φ; during production by function produce(φ) the covert
articulator inputs the new form to the phonological store, which perceives this
stimuli by the function parse(φ). Corresponding to this perception, the central
executive activates new focus for further perceptions and evaluations, and the
cycle restarts.
The integration of new contents into φ will change the environment in the form of
new beliefs, desires and intentions of the agent, and also in term of a reactive action to
take. In particular:
• by function produce(φ) new beliefs, desires or intentions could emerge, af-
fecting the environment;
• by the function parse(φ) new focus (or perception in general), and/or new
beliefs, desires and intentions may emerge, generating new φ.
Summarily, a conscious thought emerges as a result of a single round between the
phonological store and the covert articulation triggered by the phonological loop, once
the central executive has retrieved the data for the process. Once the conscious thought
is elicited by inner speech, the perception of the new context could take place, repeating
the cognitive cycle.
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Figure 3: The robot perceives the query by user (i.e. “Where is the green box”) and then it
activates the cognitive cycle for reasoning about the positions of the boxes.
4. Implementation and results
An early implementation of the proposed architecture on the Pepper Robot allows
us to estimate preliminary results in a simple scenario.
Figure 3 shows the experimental session we conducted. A set of boxes with differ-
ent colors are on the table in front of the robot. The user asks to the robot where is the
green box. The robot is engaged in describing the box in respect to the other ones. By
the inner speech the robot queries itself to retrieve useful information that allow it to
answer to our request.
We model the linguistic knowledge of the robot by associating to the question
words where, who,when the typical adverbs and prepositions used for answering to
these questions. For example, for the question word where, the typical adverbs and
prepositions are: to, from, on, left, right, up, down. In the same way, for the question
word when, typical adverbs and prepositions which are used for answering are: since,
at, from. We manually annotate question words, thus build the LanguageLTM for this
scenario.
The followed facts formalize the states of the boxes in the environment, that is:
• (box ∧ red) means that there is a red box;
• (box ∧ yellow) means that there is a yellow box;
• (box ∧ green) means that there is a green box;
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• (on (box ∧ green)(box ∧ yellow)) means that the green box is on the yellow
one;
• (right (box∧ green)(box∧ red)) means that the green box is to the rigth of the
red one;
• (right (box∧yellow)(box∧red)) means that the yellow box is to the left of the
red one.
At start time the robot believes each fact of the environment, that is: B(box ∧ red),
B(box∧yellow), B((box∧green)), B(on (box∧green)(box∧yellow)), B(right (box∧
green)(box∧red)), and B(right (box∧yellow)(box∧red)). These beliefs are stored
in the episodic buffer, because they represent short term memory related to the actual
context (the episodical memory).
When the query specifying the task (i.e. “Where is the green box?”) is perceived by
the robot by its speech recognition routines, it formalizes such a query by P(where ∧
box ∧ green). The linguistic form of φ is φ = {where, green, box}.
From the linguistic knowledge in the long term memory, the central executive re-
trieves the set of linguistic rules corresponding to that perception. At this time, the
recall function performs a simple string matching, and returns from memories the in-
formation which match to one of the word in the linguistic form φ.
For the perceived query, the recall function returns from the LanguageLTM the
set of annotated words corresponding to the question word where (this word matches
to the word where in φ), that are: {on, left, right, up, down}. These information
are integrated by phonological loop and then produced by the covert articulator in the
form of φ = {{on, left, right, up, down}, green, box}, which becomes the new
information flow inputted into the phonological store.
By parsing such a new proposition, the central executive retrieves by string match-
ing from the episodic buffer the corresponding beliefs which allow to answer to the
query. In particular, the results of this cycle are the retrieved beliefs (on (box ∧
green)(box ∧ yellow)) and (right (box ∧ green)(box ∧ red)) because they match
to the words on and right in the integrated form φ. These beliefs are in turn in-
10
tegrated in φ generating a new integrated form of type {(on (box ∧ green)(box ∧
yellow)), (right (box ∧ green)(box ∧ red)), green, box}.
The corresponding propositions are re-produced and re-hearsed by phonological
store. Considering that the central executive does not retrieve further new information,
the phonological loop will not restart a new cycle, and the process ends with the overt
articulation of the conjunction of the last propositions by the speech production rou-
tines. As result, the robot correctly answers to the query. The goal was reached by a
form of inner dialogue enabled by the proposed architecture; the approach is general
and produces same results for any kinds of objects with different properties (shape,
dimension), by adding the corresponding facts and beliefs.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, a cognitive architecture for inner speech cognition is presented. It is
based on the Standard Model of Mind to which some typical components of the inner
speech’s models for human beings were integrated.
The working memory system of the architecture includes the phonological loop as
component for storing spoken and written information, and for managing the rehearsal
process.
The inner speech is modeled as a loop in which the phonological store hears the
inner voice produced by the covert articulator process. The central executive is the
master system which drives these components that act as slave systems.
By retrieving linguistic information from the long-term memory, the central exec-
utive contributes to creating the linguistic thought whose surface form emerges by the
phonological loop. Also, the central executive retrieves related facts to the perception
from the other memories, as the episodic buffer (that is a new component defining the
episodical memory).
A preliminary event calculus allows to automatize some of the defined processes,
and it enables us to implement an early inner dialogue into the Pepper Robot; the robot
was engaged in the simple task to describe an object in respect to the others in the same
context, and by a form of inner dialogue it correctly answers to the request.
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Future works regard the extension of the architecture for enabling high-level cog-
nition for robot, as planning, regulation, and consciousness.
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